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ORGANIZING OURSELVES TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS

Marshall Brement

June 1978

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PREFACE

Marshall Brement is a senior foreign service officer specializing in Soviet affairs. His assignments have included two tours in Moscow. He currently is serving as Political Counselor of the American Embassy in Madrid. This paper was written during a six-week period at Rand in the summer of 1977.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE	111
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Section

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. TWENTY PRINCIPLES FOR DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS	5
1. Maintain a Continuing Dialogue	5
2. Broaden Contact at All Levels	5
3. Formulate All Communications as Clearly and Unambiguously as Possible	6
4. Maintain a Multiplicity of Channels	7
5. Do Not Sacrifice Precision to Gain Atmosphere	7
6. Deal With the Soviets in an Organized Manner	8
7. Avoid "Agreements in Principle"	8
8. Do Not Negotiate Against a Fixed Deadline	9
9. Avoid Detailed Negotiations at Summits	9
10. Avoid Exaggerated Optimism	10
11. Take into Account the Role of Ideology in the Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy	10
12. Adhere to Basic Principles	11
13. Adhere to Strict Reciprocity in All Our Dealings	11
14. Avoid Gestures of "Good Will"	12
15. Avoid Demands that Cannot Be Backed Up	12
16. Do Business at a Normal Level	13
17. Do Not Be Afraid of Unpleasantness if the Occasion Calls for It	13
18. Develop and Utilize a Corps of Soviet Specialists	13
19. Utilize the Resources of Our Embassy	14
20. Do Not Neglect Our Allies	14
III. THE ERA OF DÉTENTE	16
Problems of Style and Organization	17
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?	26
1. Appoint One Official to Oversee All Aspects of the Relationship	26
2. Create a State Department Bureau for Soviet and East European Affairs	26
3. Develop a Corps of Arms Control Experts with Soviet Experience	27
4. Keep Our Embassy in Moscow Fully Informed on Key Issues	28
5. Improve Recruitment and Training of Soviet Specialists	29

I. INTRODUCTION

There are times when organization and style in dealing with a rival power can be as important as grand strategy. Relations with a great nation like the Soviet Union, with its tortuous history, its cumbersome bureaucratic machinery, and its encompassing and hostile ideology, are not only a matter of formulating correct policies, but of the channels of communication one selects to convey those policies. The history of U.S.-Soviet relations is studded with missed opportunities and missed signals and is characterized consistently by the failure of each nation to understand the other's motivations and purposes.¹

In part, these failures are the result of cultural, psychological, and political differences that make meaningful discourse difficult under the best conditions. Our own system shares power with Congress, which is not always capable of appreciating all the ramifications of foreign affairs problems. We must adjust our policies to influence a fickle press and a flighty, easily bored public opinion. It is thus far more difficult for Soviet "Americanologists" to grasp the nuances of our politics than it is for our own experts to understand the dynamics of Soviet history. The "riddle wrapped in an enigma" is really Washington, not Moscow. Moreover, our political leaders have a seemingly constitutional distrust for the counsel of those Americans who know the USSR best--those who have lived and worked there, who speak the language, and who have long experience in dealing with their Soviet counterparts. This was the case, for example, during the last administration when all business of consequence was conducted either through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington or at meetings of various kinds at the Ministerial or Presidential level.

Yet much has been written about how to conduct business with Moscow by those with long experience in this area--such men as Philip Mosely, Chip Bohlen, Foy Kohler, and especially George Kennan.² In

¹See, for example, Adam B. Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II*, Viking Press, New York, 1971.

²George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1967, pp. 561-565.

fact, it is possible to cull from their experiences a set of axioms on how to deal with the Soviets. Many of these grow out of normal diplomatic practice, but with a Soviet slant. Others are rooted firmly in Russian cultural, historical, and behavioral patterns. Unfortunately, this "accepted wisdom" of our Soviet hands regarding the proper way to deal with Moscow has been ignored repeatedly by American high policymakers.

That we seem incapable of avoiding the same mistakes suggests strongly that our shortcomings are caused by factors deeply ingrained in our political system. Unlike the Soviet Union, for example, we elect our leadership for a fixed term of office. Because relations with the USSR are of paramount importance in our foreign policy, any president will want to be seen as someone who knows how to "handle the Russians," in terms of both blocking Soviet expansion and relaxing tensions in a positive way. Our adversary system of politics and the need to justify expenditures on an annual basis also present drawbacks. Furthermore, the media have become a kind of daily index charting the relative standing of the two superpowers, and this greatly magnifies and distorts real events. Front pages must be filled and the evening news must be broadcast, whether anything of significance happened that day or not. The White House naturally wants to be seen as engaging in continuing personal diplomacy, searching for new concepts, and adopting bold and creative policies toward the USSR.

However, the inherently conservative nature of the Soviet state, the enormous power at its disposal, and our own system of worldwide alliances conceived primarily to deter Soviet aggression almost ensure that experts on the USSR will tend to urge great caution and excruciatingly minute analysis of any uncharted turns in U.S.-Soviet relations. Furthermore, an enormous bureaucracy which depends for its survival on American public and Congressional perception of a tangible Soviet threat to our interests throughout the world will tend to be skeptical of policies designed to alleviate that threat. In fact, this juxtaposition of energetic high policymaking on one hand and of cautious experts on the other probably is the basis of an inherent dialectic crucible out of which United States policy toward the Soviet Union will be formed in the foreseeable future.

Complicating our relations further is that for the first time since World War II the interests of the superpowers nearly coincide on a range of current issues--e.g., law of the sea, conservation of world resources, and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the dilemma of nuclear proliferation has all the urgency of a ticking time bomb. If it is not resolved by this generation, a major catastrophe almost certainly awaits the next. For in the sphere of arms control we are moving out of the era when satellite and electronic surveillance--the so-called "national means of detection"--were reliable indices of the weaponry potential of the other side. Extremely accurate, easily concealed, unverifiable cruise missiles will almost certainly reshape the arsenals of all the major nations in the coming decades. These incipient changes underline not only the importance but also the urgency of setting the house of U.S.-Soviet relations in better order. The stakes are great and bold action may be called for which might well make it necessary to ignore expert opinions and short-circuit a recalcitrant Washington bureaucracy. However, we should keep in mind in this regard that while it is occasionally the better part of wisdom to ignore a doctor's advice, it is also foolhardy to disguise from the doctor the symptoms of the disease, thereby making his advice worthless in any case.

It is not sufficiently recognized that in the period 1971-1974 the U.S.-USSR bilateral relationship was moved forward and bureaucratic and other ties were formed which seemed to constitute a fundamental shift in the history of this relationship. But the enormous growth of bilateral ties--exchanges, committees, visits and other contacts--demanded a corresponding change in the way we were organizing ourselves to deal with the Soviets. Such a change did not take place.

The years 1975 and 1976 were characterized by a souring of détente (with the President expunging the word itself from the official American vocabulary in favor of "peace through strength") and by a renewed and growing distrust of the USSR by the American public. This was due in part to such self-evident failures as the Soviet refusal to accede to the provisions of the Trade Act and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the joint inability, after initial fanfare, to carry out the terms of the Vladivostok Agreement. The bitter dispute over Soviet intervention

in the Angolan civil war was handled so ineptly that Moscow, confident of our inability to do anything about it, felt free to take the previously unimaginable step of shipping a Cuban army to Africa to resolve the situation.

In fairness, these somber events were not caused entirely by our bumbling diplomacy. Soviet inflexibility and inability to comprehend the American political process played a major role. And so did Watergate and the fact that our government as a result lacked the power and central focus which are necessary for the effective conduct of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, a major share of the debacle was caused by unavoidable failures of perception and communication, to which our style of operation demonstrably was an important contributor.

This would be a matter only for historians were it not that bureaucratic practices carried on over a period of almost a decade and conveying all sorts of unspoken assumptions and modes of behavior are bound to be continued to some extent by a successor administration, even one formally committed to eradicating the mistakes of its predecessor. It is therefore important to recognize that U.S.-Soviet relations were not organized at an optimal level in the past and, consequently, that it is necessary to search for ways to ensure that future difficulties with Moscow will result from policy-rooted conflicts rather than from remediable failures of organization on our part.

In line with that aim, this paper attempts to lay down some general rules for conducting ourselves with the Soviets to ensure not only that we understand them to the maximum extent possible but that they increase their understanding of us as well. It attempts to describe some of the major achievements of the past several years. It tries to analyze the organizational reasons that underlie some of our most serious shortcomings, in the hope that such weaknesses will be avoided or lessened in the future. Finally, it offers some practical suggestions about how we could reorganize ourselves to handle our most important foreign policy problem.

II. TWENTY PRINCIPLES FOR DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS

1. MAINTAIN A CONTINUING DIALOGUE

Great power prestige and the observance of organizational priorities weigh heavily with the Soviet leaders, all of whom have spent their lives climbing and then maintaining themselves upon the bureaucratic ladder. Conservatism and caution--those prime bureaucratic virtues--are consequently treasured and encouraged. Furthermore, once policies are agreed on by the leadership, they undergo a laboriously formulated process of exposition and articulation to cadres all over the country. Therefore, once a course of action has been chosen, the Soviet bureaucratic system makes it extremely difficult to back away, except when penalties for not doing so are clear and unambiguous. Consequently, to be effective in our efforts to influence Soviet policy, we must make our input felt relatively early in the Soviet policy formulation process. To do this, we have to be in constant dialogue with the Soviet leadership in good times and in bad, both in Washington and in Moscow. A continuing dialogue with the Soviet leadership should be the hallmark of a détente relationship.

2. BROADEN CONTACT AT ALL LEVELS

The more direct and indirect contacts we have with Soviet citizenry through radio broadcasts, exchanges of all kinds, improved trade relations, and the establishment of new consulates throughout the Soviet Union, the better off we are. Contact between an open and a closed society, if reciprocal, ultimately must be to the benefit of the open society. However, as long as we regard the Soviets as our primary adversary in the world, we must recognize that any agreement negotiated to promote contacts and broaden relations must be acceptable to our critical media and our skeptical public if it is not to become a political liability. Therefore, agreements must stand on their own and not be rationalized primarily on political grounds.

3. FORMULATE ALL COMMUNICATIONS AS CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY AS POSSIBLE

Even Soviet experts on the United States have great difficulty understanding and articulating American political processes and how they relate to our foreign policy goals and aims. As Marshall Shulman has observed,

The absences of checks and balances can make for monumental errors on occasion. And the effect of ideological preconceptions makes for problems in perceptions and accurate reporting of events abroad. This is most acute precisely when it involves pluralistic institutions, for it is difficult to grasp the workings of pluralistic power hierarchies if one has only experienced, and if the history of one's country has only known, autocracy.³

The task of our diplomacy should be to ensure that communications between us are as understandable as possible. Those of us who have witnessed the transmission of messages that Washington intended to be constructive, but that made us objects of suspicion instead, know that this is by no means an easy task. Having personally experienced this propensity for mutual bafflement, I can only be profoundly skeptical of those who attempt to communicate with the Soviets by sending them "signals." Rather, we should be as consistent and as transparent as possible in making proposals to the Soviets, who can be relied upon to be "wary, puzzled, scornful, and suspicious when the Western negotiator tries out a series of minor variations to see if the opposing positions cannot be brought closer together. To him, it means that the Western negotiator was not serious in the first place."⁴ Of course, there are moments when ambiguity might be an appropriate response to a particular Soviet action. But such ambiguity should be calculated--not simply the result of our failure to comprehend Soviet motives or to make an

³Marshall D. Shulman, "On Learning to Live with Authoritarian Regimes," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 1, October 1977, p. 330.

⁴Philip Mosely, "Some Techniques of Negotiation," p. 22, quoted in *The Soviet Approach to Negotiations*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1969.

adequate analysis of the mode of communication that would have the most effect in Moscow.

4. MAINTAIN A MULTIPLICITY OF CHANNELS

Use of one unchecked channel, particularly in oral communication, to convey important policy messages is bound to lead to disaster on occasion, even if the one channel is as polished and effective a diplomat as Ambassador Dobrynin. The Soviet Embassy in Washington is not only a conveyer of messages, it is also an analyst and a propagator of particular views and policy recommendations. Moreover, these views and recommendations are occasionally at variance with those put forward by fellow Americanologists in Moscow. To ask someone to convey to his government messages that contradict or cast doubt upon his own previous estimates, whether intentional or not, places a heavy burden on his probity, particularly when he is confident that he will be the only source of that information. To avoid mix-ups such as those regarding the emigration of Soviet Jews that occurred during the negotiations over the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, it would be wise to use our ambassador in Moscow as a cross-check to ensure that important messages have been delivered accurately and in the proper context. It is obviously more important for Brezhnev and Gromyko to understand the nuances of our point of view than it is for Dobrynin to do so.

5. DO NOT SACRIFICE PRECISION TO GAIN ATMOSPHERE

The fact of reaching a major agreement with the Soviets can be extremely important in setting the right tone and establishing a positive atmosphere for U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the extreme bureaucratic nature of the Soviet system and the cast of the Russian mind guarantee that they will interpret any agreement in such a way as to derive the maximum possible short-term benefits for the USSR. The Soviets are sharp traders. No Soviet negotiator would refuse to take advantage of a good price on a wheat deal in the overall interests of U.S.-Soviet relations. To do so would not win him a very good Efficiency Report, and in the ultimate bureaucratic state that is

the Soviet Union, one's career depends on such reports. Ambiguities therefore must be kept to a minimum, and if the Soviets insist on ambiguity, watch out! We learned to our sorrow in SALT, for example, that the Soviet lack of cooperation in specifying just what was meant by a "heavy" ICBM was no accident of the negotiating process. This subject had to be treated only by very general language because Soviet systems still under development would have been curtailed by the kind of stipulations we were trying to insert into the agreement.⁵ As Arthur Dean pointed out, an agreement with the Soviets that does "not rest on consensus and clear definitions may be worse than no agreement at all."

6. DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS IN AN ORGANIZED MANNER

We can, of course, never hope to match the Soviets in this regard, nor would we want to. They are as organized in their handling of foreign affairs as a big nation can be, particularly in their relations with the United States. But if our policies and our approach to the Soviets are to be clear to the Russians themselves, to our allies, and to the American people and their representatives, we must have a concept of what our current policy is and where we want our relationship to go. As much as possible, therefore, we should try to speak with one voice. It is particularly important that officials conducting day-to-day relations with the Soviets have general political guidance. (The Soviets find it very hard to believe such is not always the case with us.) Moscow can be counted on to take quick advantage of conflicts and inconsistencies among diplomats; American firms or agencies of the government who seek private advantage are equally vulnerable.

7. AVOID "AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE"

A favorite Soviet tactic is to insist on loosely worded agreements in principle that can be interpreted later to suit Moscow's convenience. We attempted to get around this at SALT by issuing our own unilateral

⁵Colin S. Gray, "Salt I Aftermath," *Air Force Magazine*, November 1975, pp. 28-33.

interpretations of the meaning of certain clauses of the agreement. The Soviets then proceeded to demonstrate graphically that they did not consider themselves bound in any way by our interpretations. This is a long-established Soviet practice. Philip Mosely noted⁶ that one of the main pitfalls in Anglo-American negotiations with the Soviet Union during World War II was the tendency to rely upon reaching such "agreements in principle" without spelling out in sufficient detail the steps in their execution. In this situation, the Western powers sometimes "gained the principle of their hopes, only to find that in practice the Soviet government continued to pursue its original aims."

8. DO NOT NEGOTIATE AGAINST A FIXED DEADLINE

Unless the Russian bureaucratic mind or the Soviet system change in some very fundamental ways, we can be fairly certain that no concessions will be made in any dispute or negotiation until the Kremlin is fully satisfied that the other side has taken a firm, unshakable position. Furthermore, having had cause to appreciate and reflect on the lack of consistency and continuity inherent in the American negotiating process, the Soviets understand that time constraints weigh far more heavily on us than on them. They can therefore be counted on in any dispute to wait us out until the last possible minute. Thus, we place ourselves at a real disadvantage when we negotiate with them against a fixed deadline. We should keep in mind that every successful treaty negotiation we have ever had with the Soviets--the Austrian State treaty, the test ban, SALT, even the civil aviation and consular agreements--were the products of many years of bargaining.

9. AVOID DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS AT SUMMITS

A corollary to this last principle is that we should rarely use summitry for detailed negotiation, as was the case during the hectic maneuvering over SALT at the Moscow summit of 1972. Summitry has its place in U.S.-Soviet relations, largely as a device to maneuver

⁶Mosely, 1969, p. 20.

unpopular concessions made by the leadership past a reluctant bureaucracy by facing it with a *fait accompli*. Both in Washington and in Moscow decisions often have to be imposed from above. However, the Kremlin understands full well--in fact, probably exaggerates--the political impact of summits in the United States, as well as the President's need to make the summit appear a tangible success. This practically ensures that in any detailed negotiation at the summit the U.S. negotiator will not get the best of the bargain.

10. AVOID EXAGGERATED OPTIMISM

The nature of the American political system and the sharp pull of the media on our perceptions guarantee that the natural up and down swings in our relations will become magnified. As a result, when things are good, modest ameliorations tend to be described as historic turning points. And when relations move back in the opposite direction, as they inevitably must, even genuine advances tend to be sullenly disparaged as valueless, and a needless bitterness is triggered in a new generation of the disillusioned. Therefore, those who formulate U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must compensate for this tendency by eschewing the dramatic "breakthrough" and by always keeping the long-term basis of the relationship firmly in mind. "Steady as she goes," should be the motto of our helmsmen.

11. TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE FORMATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The Soviets, in their direct dealings with the United States, behave more or less as a traditional great power, but communist dogma plays a tangible role in determining their policies as well, particularly in the third world. The extent to which Soviet leaders believe their own propaganda is always a question; what is certain is that they believe it to some extent. For reasons that bear as much on internal political concerns as on external ones, Moscow feels itself bound to stress its role as the vanguard of all progressive forces throughout the world and to be seen as counselling, leading, and supporting all

"national liberation" struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Furthermore, in view of the nonconvertibility of the ruble and the generally backward state of Soviet technology in the civilian sector, the Soviets have discovered that the one area in which they can supply aid generally competitive with that of capitalist countries is in the military sphere. Americans tend to see the détente relationship as a total one, in which each point of contact is related to all others; the Soviets have repeatedly and carefully exempted from détente their support for national liberation movements. By the Kremlin's self-serving reasoning, this is part of the ideological struggle that must intensify during a period of East-West relaxation of other tensions. Thus, there was never any real question that the Soviets would furnish their clients in Angola with sufficient military aid to ensure that they were seen as fulfilling their revolutionary obligations. What could and should have been discussed early on, in the hope of avoiding a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, was the scope of their aid program and the form it would take.

12. ADHERE TO BASIC PRINCIPLES

Commitment to the basic principles underlying the political structure of Western society should be explicitly and consistently upheld in the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with the Soviet Union. The tactics must, of course, be decided on case by case. But we ought to recognize that in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, it is the Soviets who have maintained a consistency of purpose often sadly lacking on the American side. The moods of the American public, of the American media, of the American Congress, and even of the American government, can be very volatile. Therefore, to ensure public support and the maximum internal cohesion of the U.S. government, we should base our policies toward the Soviets on firm principles and articulate these principles as forcefully, as clearly, and as publicly as possible.

13. ADHERE TO STRICT RECIPROCITY IN ALL OUR DEALINGS

Strict reciprocity must be the hallmark of our bilateral dealings with the Soviets. Because of their internal coherence and our own

overall lack of purpose and direction in dealing with them, all too often we have ignored or overlooked "minor" Soviet infractions of agreements or understandings in the hope of bettering the "climate" of our relations or of achieving major breakthroughs in more important matters than those being negotiated. As a result, the Soviets have subjected us to continual nickel-and-diming for advantage at which they are past masters. Consequently, we have often suddenly been seen to be in a distinctly inferior position, and this has ultimately contributed to disenchantment--public, Congressional, and within the Executive branch--with the possibility of a broader normalization of our relations. This disenchantment, to quote one Soviet expert "is as unnecessary as the record of petty and casual sharp practice which produces it." It is remediable over the long run through firm insistence on immediate and strict reciprocity covering all facets of the relationship as a matter of principle.

14. AVOID GESTURES OF "GOOD WILL"

Gestures of "good will," particularly during negotiations, will not profit the American side. The Russians, lacking natural geographic barriers and engaged throughout the centuries in constant hostilities with their neighbors, as George Kennan put it, "have no conception of permanent friendly relations between states....For them, all foreigners are potential enemies."⁷ The years of Soviet isolation, surrounded by a hostile capitalist world, only enhances this feeling. As a result, well-meaning concessions often generate suspicion, not good will. In such circumstances, the Soviets begin to wonder whether they may have overestimated our determination and should have been demanding more from us.

15. AVOID DEMANDS THAT CANNOT BE BACKED UP

When we are dealing with Moscow, no gesture at all is better than an empty one. We not only owe it to ourselves not to be caught bluffing

⁷Kennan, 1967, p. 561.

or blustering, but we owe it to those within the Soviet government arguing the case for or against a given policy because of the effect that such a policy would have on U.S.-Soviet relations. If we let such people down, it makes it doubly difficult for them the next time a similar case arises. In any event, our utterances will become convincing to the Soviets only if we maintain our consistency and credibility.

16. DO BUSINESS AT A NORMAL LEVEL

To the extent possible, avoid negotiations of routine matters at the ministerial level or higher. The Soviets aim to settle a great deal of ordinary business at the highest possible level. They have learned from experience that our leaders, when approached on minor matters, tend to grant concessions to the Soviets on the spot.

17. DO NOT BE AFRAID OF UNPLEASANTNESS IF THE OCCASION CALLS FOR IT

Westerners generally, and Americans particularly, find it embarrassing to confront opponents with unpleasant facts. On scores of occasions I have observed this tendency on the part of visiting Congressmen and other Americans who will shy away from disputing what they consider to be false or unsound statements by their Russian hosts. Americans think of this as being polite; the Soviets regard it as acquiescence. This un-yankee squeamishness at calling a spade a spade is doubly unfortunate because Russians generally enjoy the cut and thrust of debate and rarely hold grudges over it; the more vigorous an opponent is, the more he is seen as deserving respect for defending his country's position.

18. DEVELOP AND UTILIZE A CORPS OF SOVIET SPECIALISTS

Dealing with the Soviet Union requires genuine professionalism. This means not only developing and training a corps of specialists who are thoroughly conversant with Russian politics, economics, strategy, and culture, it means using such people to advise senior officials and to engage in important negotiations. No matter how innovative a policy is when it is conceived, when policymakers turn to other concerns,

specialists must then keep the wheels of policy turning. This does not mean that our dealings with the Soviet Union should be made the exclusive domain of Soviet area specialists. Area expertise, although very important, is only one ingredient for good decisionmaking. Our objective should be to weave Soviet expertise into all levels of the policy-making and implementing process so that it becomes an organic part. This cannot be done until we accept the importance of expertise. For example, there is not a single officer in any position of high authority in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--an agency of the government that deals almost exclusively with the USSR--who has Soviet area experience or who can speak the Russian language. This is graphic proof that expertise about the USSR has somehow not been considered relevant to the formulation policy.

19. UTILIZE THE RESOURCES OF OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW

Again, to quote George Kennan,

The task of making Washington's views known to Moscow and gaining understanding for them on the part of Soviet officialdom is not one which can be adequately performed by sporadic encounters between various personalities at the most senior levels. Not only are the senior American figures concerned not always cognizant of the real meaning and background for the words and expressions used by their several opposite numbers, even when faithfully translated, but there is also the fact that Washington's point of view, if it is to be effectively presented, has to be put currently, almost daily, to people in the official Soviet establishment, has to be put by persons who know how to put it, linguistically and otherwise, and has to be put not just at one level but a variety of them.⁸

20. DO NOT NEGLECT OUR ALLIES

Naturally, U.S.-Soviet relations are of interest to our allies, who--if not properly briefed--become concerned that close consultation between the superpowers could signify the formation of a Moscow-Washington condominium that might eventually threaten their national

⁸George F. Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1977, p. 251.

interests. Only a handful of people within the Administration, and none of our allies, examined the Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War before it was unveiled and signed publicly at the summit. As a courtesy, a few of our allies were informed just in advance of the signing; the rest read about it in the newspapers.⁹ Similarly, our allies were disturbed when we called a questionable alert of our forces during the 1973 Middle East War and failed to notify them in advance of our action.¹⁰ Even some of our untarnished triumphs were marred by this unfortunate propensity, as in the case of our failure to notify the Japanese in advance of our opening to China in 1971. Alliance without trust is not worth much, and the leader of any alliance should keep this in the forefront of his consciousness.

⁹Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians," *International Security*, Spring 1977, p. 21.

¹⁰Ray S. Cline, "Policy Without Intelligence," *Foreign Policy*, No. 17, Winter 1974/75, p. 128.

III. THE ERA OF DÉTENTE

The era of détente may well turn out to have been an important turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations. It was an achievement that cannot be adequately conveyed in simple statistics, but the statistics are impressive. In 1969, 3500 Soviet citizens visited the United States, and in 1976, 12,200 Soviets came to our country. During that same period, the U.S.-Soviet trade turnover increased from 158 million dollars to 2,527 billion dollars, giving the United States a favorable trade balance of more than two billion dollars. Twenty-six U.S. firms are now doing business in Moscow, including some of our major banks. None were there in 1969. Scientific and cultural exchanges have increased fourfold. Eleven cooperative agreements have been signed and are in the process of being vigorously carried out. Under the aegis of these joint agreements, 200 specific projects have been initiated, with 1,000 Americans and 1,000 Soviets traveling each way annually. New consulates have been opened in New York, San Francisco, Leningrad, and Kiev. A series of arms control negotiations has been initiated and a strategic arms limitations agreement has been signed. More than 25 agencies of the U.S. government, many of them with only limited foreign affairs experience, have become involved in direct dealings with the USSR. It is now possible to communicate with a whole series of Soviet officials who a decade ago could not or would not make themselves available to foreigners, thereby giving us many new opportunities to advocate U.S. views and interpret American society to important elements of Soviet society.

The volume of two-way official business carried on between Washington and Moscow has reached impressive proportions, now probably exceeding that between the United States and any other country in the world. An American official tasked with following the broad range of U.S.-Soviet relations in the spring of 1977, a time when the relationship was at a near standstill, would, for example, have been looking forward wearily to: a visit by Secretary Vance to Moscow at the end of March; SALT standing consultative committee (SCC) meetings in

Geneva from March through May; the SALT talks in Geneva; the Commission on Disarmament (CCD) meetings; the Mass Destruction Weapons expert meeting; the chemical warfare technical bilaterals; the Comprehensive Test-Ban discussions in April; the Incidents at Sea talks in Washington in May; the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial meeting in Washington in May; grain reserve talks at the International Wheat Council in London in June; the ongoing sessions of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna; bilateral talks on CSCE implementation in Moscow; the Law of the Sea Conference in New York in May; discussions regarding the opening of consulates in Kiev and New York; discussions regarding the construction of new embassies in Moscow and Washington; upcoming talks reviewing the status of the Consular Agreement; the annual U.S.-USSR joint committee meetings on atomic energy; and similar joint committee meetings on the world oceans, on transportation, on the environment, on science and technology, and on agriculture; as well as visits by several important Soviet delegations to the United States.

This burgeoning increase in U.S.-Soviet contacts of all kinds obviously required an increase in both the quality and quantity of competent Soviet specialists with language capability and substantive background, both in our Embassy in Moscow and throughout Washington, in those organizations dealing with Soviet affairs. But no effort was made to treat this as a serious problem.

PROBLEMS OF STYLE AND ORGANIZATION

The general operational theory which has governed our relations with the Soviets for the past 30 years has been to restrict vital information to the President, and a small handful of people on his immediate staff. In this way, it was thought, the administration could move quickly, deftly, and if necessary, unexpectedly, to create the maximum amount of flexibility and the greatest possible number of options in dealing with any problem. To do this it was necessary to short-circuit what was perceived to be a cumbersome bureaucracy.¹¹

¹¹The essence of bureaucracy is its quest for safety. Its success is calculability. Profound policy thrives on perpetual creation, on a constant redefinition of goals; good administration thrives on routine...

The theory itself is esthetically neat and cogent with obvious advantages. However, it overlooks at least three important facts: (1) proper staff work by aides who have all the necessary information at their disposal is essential to avoid mistakes; (2) mistakes, particularly in dealing with an adversary superpower, can be very costly; and (3) failure to consult informed and expert opinion can also limit flexibility, reduce possible options, and deny oneself alternate and even more correct lines of analysis. Furthermore, the theory suffers in execution because the top policymaker does not have the time (or generally the inclination) to decide how far down in the hierarchy every datum of information should be circulated. This has to be left to the judgment of staff assistants and secretaries who have no real understanding of the issues involved and of who really has a "need to know." (What such people soon learn, however, is that when the "secrecy principle" is being applied, the penalty for passing on information is great, and that little if any blame attaches to the aide who withholds it.)

But in the serious arena of international negotiation it should be self-evident that every important issue must be followed not only by chiefs but by Indians as well--Indians who devote themselves completely to mastering all relevant data concerning particular issues and who have access to such relevant data. Secrecy is very important if the maximum maneuverability is to be maintained, but adequate staff work, especially for major negotiations, is even more so.

It is the Kremlin's top experts on the United States who conduct major negotiations with us.¹² They have a firm historical grasp of all

Policy involves an adjustment of risks; administration an avoidance of of division....Bureaucracies are designed to execute, not to conceive." Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1964, pp. 326-327.

¹²Facing us across the SALT table in Moscow assisting Brezhnev we find, for example, Gromyko, Foreign Minister for more than 20 years and former Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations; Dobrynin, Ambassador in Washington for 15 years and before that for five years Number Two in their Embassy; Kornienko, a Deputy Foreign Minister with 29 consecutive years of experience in dealing with U.S.-Soviet relations; Alexandrov-Agentov, Brezhnev's man on SALT, who has followed strategic matters for more than 10 years and who is a career diplomat; and, on a more junior level, Komplektov and Sokolov from the American section of

the issues and can be counted on to make few, if any, careless errors. Many experts¹³ in fact argue that there has been a real imbalance in negotiating ability between the superpowers and that time and again we have made errors that resulted from poor coordination, poor staff work, and poor organization. Most important, our top negotiator simply did not fully understand or grasp the importance of certain complicated subjects--an inescapable result when significant officials with direct lines of responsibility are kept in the dark on key aspects of our policy and our strategy.

Coordination between the two levels not only has been better on the Soviet side but certain built-in asymmetries have tended to favor the Soviets at the back channel-summit level of negotiations....The Soviets have been better able to manipulate dealings through the back channel for their own ends as well as to generate an internally less abrasive and better integrated SALT strategy than the American side....Perhaps the most damaging complaint lodged against the back channel, particularly as it was operated by Kissinger during the Nixon administration, has been that it implied lack of trust in subordinates, impaired effective working relationships, and sometimes deprived those at the top of available expertise that would have helped to parry Soviet SALT tactics. With regard to SALT-related negotiations at the summit, much the same criticism has been voiced as to the allegedly pernicious effects of excessive secrecy and failure to inform responsible subordinates in the U.S. SALT apparatus of what was happening at the highest level. Such a practice as Nixon's reliance upon Soviet interpreters, said to be prompted by his suspicion that details of closed sessions might be leaked within the U.S. bureaucracy by American interpreters, has been cited as an egregious example of

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, career diplomats with more than 15 years of direct experience in Soviet-American affairs. These officials are all fluent in English. Sokolov and Dobrynin are practically bilingual. On our side of the SALT table, however, only our Ambassador can speak Russian or has any experience in Soviet affairs, and throughout the Kissinger era he had nothing to say about SALT policy.

¹³ See, for example, John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1973, p. 91; Thomas Wolfe, *The SALT Experience: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decisionmaking*, The Rand Corporation, R-1686-PR, September 1975, p. 237; Garthoff, 1977, p. 11; Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism*, January/February 1975, p. 29; Gray, 1975, p. 28; Paul Nitze, "SALT: The Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 17, Winter 1974/75, passim.

secretive procedures that not only kept in the dark various U.S. officials with a need to know but resulted in there being no precise U.S. record of what was said at the summit. The practice on the U.S. side of bringing no military representatives to summit meetings in contrast to close consultation between Soviet political leaders and their top military advisors also has been noted as a procedural asymmetry that could cause unnecessary difficulty in dealing with relevant detail during summit negotiations.¹⁴

It is difficult to understand, for example, why we failed to clarify the subject of air-launched and sea-launched strategic cruise missiles with the Soviets during the meeting between President Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974,¹⁵ although our cruise missile program, incorporating new breakthroughs in guidance systems and fan jet engines, was in an advanced state of development and on the public record,¹⁶ and the Soviets were well aware of it.¹⁷ Certainly the potential of the cruise missile to derail the Vladivostok accord was immediately obvious to those with technical knowledge of its capabilities.¹⁸ Therefore, why should there have been an "honest misunderstanding" between Ford and Brezhnev over whether long-range

¹⁴Wolfe, 1975, pp. 236-237.

¹⁵Henry T. Simmons, "SALT II--Problems and Prospects," *International Defense Review*, April 1975; Henry Bradsher, *Washington Star*, November 22, 1975, p. 1; Oswald Johnston, *Los Angeles Times*, December 12, 1975; Leslie H. Gelb, *New York Times*, October 16, 1975; Robert Kleiman, "Crisis in Detente," *New York Times*, October 14, 1975.

¹⁶It was announced in June 1972. Public testimony fully describing the current state of the art was presented to Congress on April 16, 1974, and 109 pages of testimony were recorded in *Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, FY 1975, Authorization for Military Procurement, Part 7, 93d Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D.C., pp. 3619-3728*, during which one officer testified (p. 3697) that "the office of DDR&E did in fact conduct an analysis for Secretary Kissinger just last year to evaluate the contribution in the strategic arena of cruise missiles."

¹⁷V. Shiltov, "The Arms Race is Being Speeded Up--Cruise Missiles Again," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, March 22, 1974, contains an extensive description of strategic cruise missile characteristics and notes that they are expected to have a range of 1800 to 2400 kilometers.

¹⁸See, for example, Clarence A. Robinson, "SALT Proposals Facing Hurdles," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, December 9, 1974.

cruise missiles were included in the most important negotiation that the two superpowers undertook in 1974? Why should we have to tolerate "sloppy and hurried" negotiations at the highest level of our government?¹⁹ What would we think of the negotiators of a merger between the Ford Motor Company and General Motors, for example, who had an "honest disagreement" after the public and triumphant conclusion of the negotiation as to whether the Chevrolet division of General Motors were included in the merger?

To cite another case, how could we sign a strategic arms limitation agreement allowing for a "10 to 15 percent" increase in the size of the silos housing land-based ICBMs without demanding a definition of what was meant by "increase"--length? diameter? volume? Why the phrase "10 to 15 percent?" Why not just 15 percent? Were we aware that if the Soviets perfected the "cold launch" technique and if "increase" were interpreted to mean in volume, then they could legally deploy ICBMs 50 percent larger than those used at the time and still be within the terms of the 10 to 15 percent "increase" in silo limitations agreed to in SALT I?²⁰

Similar questions arise in a different area regarding the Gromyko letter to Kissinger of October 26, 1974 on Jewish emigration, which stated:

I must say frankly that the aforementioned materials including the correspondence between you and Senator Jackson create a distorted picture of our position and of what we have told the American side on this question.

In explaining the actual state of affairs in response to your request we emphasize that this question as such falls wholly within the internal jurisdiction of our state. At the same time we notified you that on this question we have acted and shall continue to act exclusively in accordance with our country's existing legislation on this score.

¹⁹ Authoritative administration officials are quoted as attributing the difficulties in achieving a SALT II accord to "the many misunderstandings that the officials said had been created by sloppy and hurried negotiations between President Ford and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Party Leader, in Vladivostok last November, coupled with several instances of Mr. Ford's and Mr. Kissinger's backing away from concessions previously made." Leslie H. Gelb, *The New York Times*, October 16, 1975, p. 1.

²⁰ Gray, 1975.

But now silence is being maintained on just this point. At the same time attempts are now being made to ascribe to the explanations that we gave you the nature of some kind of assurances, almost commitments, on our part with respect to the procedure for the departure of Soviet citizens from the USSR. Some figures are even being cited regarding the supposed number of such citizens and there is talk about an anticipated increase in this number as compared to past years.

We resolutely reject such an interpretation. What we said--and you, Mr. Secretary, know this very well--had to do only with the actual situation on this question. And when the conversation did turn to figures--by way of informing you about the actual situation--what we talked about was quite the reverse, it was about the incipient tendency toward a decrease in the number of persons wishing to leave the USSR for permanent residence in other countries.²¹

The fact that the Soviets finally made it public December 19, almost two months after it was sent and two days after a Central Committee plenum, measurably increased the already great authoritativeness of this letter. How could it be explained away as a "flank-covering operation?"²² What expert on the Soviet Union regarded it so?

More important, should Congress have been allowed to vote on the Trade Bill in the mistaken assumption that the Jackson-Vanik amendment was acceptable to the Soviets on the basis of an alleged compromise worked out several months earlier when the administration knew that

²¹*Pravda*, December 19, 1974.

²²"Eight days after the letters were sent, Gromyko made a point of vehemently denying in a secret note to Kissinger that he had given any "assurances" whatsoever--only "elucidations"--of existing Soviet laws, as he puts it. Gromyko also denied that his government anticipated any increase in emigration, insisting that he had told Kissinger all along that the number of visa seekers was declining.

"This protest now appears to have been a flank-covering operation by Gromyko, for Soviet Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev is understood to have reconfirmed the original understandings in the Kissinger letter during the Vladivostok summit meeting with President Ford in late November. Consequently, when Kissinger returned from Vladivostok to appear before a Senate Committee, he stood behind the original wording of his letter to Jackson, not even mentioning the Gromyko protest." Joseph Albright, "The Peace of the Two Henrys," *New York Times Magazine*, January 5, 1975, p. 16.

the so-called compromise would never be acquiesced in by Moscow? How are the Soviets meant to interpret such behavior, which must strike them as irresponsible in the extreme?

The dispute over Angola is another case where American experts on the USSR were kept in the dark and had no voice or influence in the shaping of our policy. The Kremlin's decision to ship a Cuban army to Angola was a difficult one, unprecedented in Soviet history. As a result of that decision it became impossible for the superpowers to arrive at a politically acceptable compromise solution in the strategic arms talks, sending U.S.-Soviet relations into a long-lasting decline. The Soviets did not want this to happen and, in fact, did not even envision its happening. Our diplomatic problem in Angola was to make the Kremlin see that any temporary gain in Africa at our expense would be more than balanced by the permanent effects the Angola situation would have on Soviet relations with us.

It should be kept in mind that in the late spring of 1975 the prospects for continued improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations had rarely seemed so propitious. With the end of the war in Vietnam, for the first time since Brezhnev came to power there was no major armed conflict anywhere in the world where we were lined up against one of Moscow's client states. We seemed close to working out a compromise embodying the provisions of the Vladivostok Agreement, and from there to ratifying SALT II. This would have led to a Brezhnev summit visit to Washington, which he clearly wanted, before the 25th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, scheduled for the following spring. A Brezhnev visit to Washington would have been the object of enormous fanfare in the Soviet Union and a great boost for détente. Therefore, we were not without cards to play in attempting to persuade the Soviets not to undertake rash actions in Africa. Nor did we lack talking points or proper occasions to broach the subject at the highest level.

In fact, Ford and Brezhnev met privately several times at the ceremonies accompanying the signing of the Helsinki Agreement in August 1975, a pact billed in the Soviet Union as a great triumph for Brezhnev's détente policy. In terms of both the current state of U.S.-Soviet

relations and the actual situation on the ground in Angola--where anti-Communist forces seemed to have considerable strength--this would have been an ideal time for raising our concerns about the situation there and attempting to work out some compromise solution. We had already demonstrated, by willingness to recognize the Communist government in Mozambique, that we would not necessarily be overtly opposed to a coalition government in Luanda, a solution that had been envisioned before fighting erupted among the three competing liberation movements in that country. We knew that the Kremlin had been giving material and moral support to one of those liberation movements for a dozen years and that it could hardly turn its back on that movement with independence less than three months away. Nevertheless, we chose not to raise the Angolan issue with Brezhnev in Helsinki.²⁴ Whether we intended it or not, our failure to bring up the subject was almost surely regarded by the Soviets as an invitation to let the competing armies fight it out on the ground. It was also clearly regarded by the Kremlin as a bluff, for the Soviets knew that we had already played out our stakes and could not obtain further major backing from a distrustful Congress, and they had a decisive ace in the hole--Cubans.

It was not until September, after basic Soviet decisions had been made, that we even tentatively raised the Angolan issue with them, and not until the end of October that we broached it officially. Even then it was only in Washington with the Soviet ambassador, who had no doubt already pointed out to his government that the administration's hands were tied in Angola by a recalcitrant Congress.²⁵ Through informal contacts with Soviets in Moscow throughout this period it became clear that Soviet experts on the United States were underestimating the effect Angola could have on American-Soviet relations, obviously based in part on our failure to raise the subject at the highest level when we had many opportunities to do so.

²⁴David Binder, "U.S. Slow to Warn Soviets in Angola," *New York Times*, December 25, 1975.

²⁵Binder, *op. cit.*

Soviet officials who study the United States full-time do not seem to take seriously the argument that Angola could become a focus for powerful anti-detente and anti-Soviet feeling among some segments of the American electorate.... Soviet sources have consistently stressed what they consider the peripheral and transient nature of the Angolan conflict in the broad context of Soviet-American relations. As one Russian put it several weeks ago, "Angola will fade away."²⁶

Had our style allowed us to seek the advice of our experts and to use other channels of communication with the USSR, had our ambassador in Moscow been instructed in the spring or early summer of 1975 to make a careful presentation to Brezhnev and Gromyko about Angola, had the President then raised it vigorously with Brezhnev in Helsinki, particularly in the context of SALT, there is reason to believe that a bargain regarding Angola could have been reached between Washington and Moscow. Had that been achieved, U.S.-Soviet relations would almost certainly have taken a different turn, as would the history of Africa.

²⁶David K. Shipler, "Moscow Exhibits Calm on Angola," *New York Times*, February 9, 1976; see also Christopher S. Wren, "Africa, an Inviting Arena," *New York Times*, December 28, 1975.

IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

No carefully worked out system of organization will ensure that this or any future administration will avoid mistakes in dealing with the USSR. But it is clear from even a cursory examination of our past dealings with Moscow that failure to organize ourselves properly was at the very least a contributing factor in our errors. This has been true ever since we restored diplomatic relations with the Soviets in 1933. That there is room for improvement nobody can deny. Hopefully, implementation of all or any of the five suggestions offered below would contribute positively to U.S.-Soviet relations.

1. APPOINT ONE OFFICIAL TO OVERSEE ALL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

It is not possible for the Secretary of State--no matter how extensive his talents--to do his job adequately if he is simultaneously functioning as desk officer for Soviet affairs. However, the current Department of State organization forces the Secretary to assume that task because there is nobody underneath him in the hierarchy who deals with the entire range of our relations with Moscow. We should therefore consider carefully whether the establishment of an Undersecretary of State for Strategic and Soviet Affairs would better serve our national interest. Reporting to him would be the elements of the Department that now constitute the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and the Offices of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs of the Bureau of European Affairs. This would, at one stroke, overcome most of the irrational aspects of organization that have plagued us in the past, parallel the bureaucratic structure which the Soviets use to deal with us, and considerably ease the burdens on the Secretary.

2. CREATE A STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAU FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The United States spends more than a quarter of its national budget dealing with the Soviet Union and has more bilateral business with

the USSR than any other country, but it is the only major Western nation without an official of Assistant Secretary or comparable rank dealing exclusively with Soviet and East European Affairs in its foreign ministry. Instead, we subsume Soviet affairs under the broader aegis of European affairs and ask one Assistant Secretary of State to be in charge of everything from London to Vladivostok. It is time we recognized that any official who handles both Western and Eastern Europe is bound to devote a majority of his efforts to dealing with knotty relations with our allies. Hardly a week goes by without a visit to Washington by a top European dignitary. The amount of work that goes into such visits is not generally understood--not to mention frequent trips abroad by the President, Vice President, or Secretary--nor is the burden this places on an Assistant Secretary of State. Furthermore, our business with Western Europe is usually urgent and decisions cannot be postponed, while our relations with the Soviets require a longer range focus. The result is that East European interests and priorities will almost always be deferred in favor of Western European ones at the bureau level in the Department. In fact, despite the best intentions and the highest ability (and it is a safe assumption that career officers chosen to fill the job of Assistant Secretary of State for Europe are people of the highest ability), it is almost impossible for someone handling Western European affairs to devote adequate time and creative energy to dealing with the Soviet Union.

3. DEVELOP A CORPS OF ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS WITH SOVIET EXPERIENCE

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are the linchpin of U.S.-Soviet relations, and arms control negotiations dominate our official bilateral diplomatic contacts. Yet our embassy in Moscow has been cut off from this process. Furthermore, those large (and not understaffed) areas in Washington that deal with this problem (including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the State Department) are almost completely devoid of people with Soviet experience. This contrasts markedly with the situation on the Soviet side where fluent knowledge of the English language and service in the United States is almost a prerequisite for senior

officials dealing with arms control matters. As a means of ensuring that our embassy in Moscow is focused on this important field, as it is on other major aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations, we should establish in the embassy a separate four-man section dealing with multilateral security matters and headed by a Counselor for Political-Military Affairs. In addition to reporting on their area of interest and maintaining ties with Soviet specialists in that area, these diplomats could actually be members of our delegations as representatives of the Ambassador in all major arms control negotiations with the Soviets. During breaks in such talks, when the rest of the delegation goes back to Washington, they would return to Moscow and, among other things, be charged with maintaining contacts with their Soviet counterparts. This would enhance the skills of our various delegations negotiating with the Soviets and bring our embassy fully into the policymaking process. It would also build up over the years a corps of officers experienced in the arts of negotiation, fluent in the Russian language, and skilled in the arms control field. (That there are only a handful of such officers in U.S. government service is ample testimony to the haphazard way we have been administering our relations with the Soviet Union.)

4. KEEP OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW FULLY INFORMED ON KEY ISSUES

Full advantage should be taken of our Embassy's ability to advocate and expound United States policy and actions to a broad range of Soviet officials and intellectuals, as well as the Ambassador's ability to get our message across to the highest political levels. Our aim--the hallmark of a true and mutually beneficial relationship--should be to maintain a political dialogue with the Soviets to ensure that our voice is factored into the Soviet policymaking process. In this context, we should be supplying Americanologists in the Soviet bureaucracy with ammunition to allow them to explain clearly to the political leadership the effects on U.S.-Soviet relations of Soviet foreign policy moves inimical to our interests. The embassy was unable to have a constructive dialogue with the Soviets about Angola in the spring and summer of 1975 because it simply was not informed about what the United States was doing there or why we were doing it. Soviet journalists and

academicians, as well as officials, not only had a detailed grasp of what their own government was up to, but had a more accurate picture of American actions in Angola than did representatives of the U.S. Embassy. It is self-evident that Mr. Gromyko, a Politburo member and a very busy man, will have little interest in, for example, a discussion of the Middle East with the American Ambassador if he is convinced that the Ambassador is not fully informed about U.S. policy in that part of the world.

5. IMPROVE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF SOVIET SPECIALISTS

As a first step, we must acknowledge that the U.S. government, especially the Foreign Service, is not attracting a sufficient number of motivated applicants interested in Soviet affairs,²⁷ a problem that may require more support over the long run for graduate level Soviet studies centers. In the shorter term, the U.S. government should:

- a. Make an active effort to inform graduate and undergraduate centers of Soviet studies of its interest in recruiting Soviet specialists;
- b. Attempt to attract to government service junior scholars who have actually lived and worked in the USSR;
- c. Instruct Foreign Service selection boards to give favorable consideration to applicants possessing skills relevant to service in the USSR;
- d. Create a special track of Foreign Service Officers who agree to spend the major portion of their careers in Soviet affairs and train them to the same level of proficiency in Russian language and culture that the Department was requiring in 1929, when it gave Bohlen and Kennan three years of university level instruction

²⁷ There were 49 applications by Foreign Service Officers for Russian language training four years ago, and only 17 last year. Furthermore, only two officers entered the State Department last year fully fluent in Russian.

and individual tutoring (on top of academic training before entering the Foreign Service);

- e. Establish a language school in the USSR to train U.S. government Soviet specialists (there are similar State Department schools for Chinese, Japanese, and Arabic);
- f. Create postings, such as exhibit guides or slots in our consulates in Leningrad and Kiev, and regard them as intended primarily to train and broaden those officers assigned to fill them.

In sum, we should systematically examine our past diplomatic practices, as well as the rationality of the organizational structure we have created to deal with the Soviet Union. We should consider adopting forms of organization more similar to those employed by most other large governments, including the Soviet government itself. At the same time, we should attempt to agree on the national importance of coordinating our actions and policies. In this regard, no single task is more important than ensuring that our Soviet specialists are making the contribution they should to our deliberations, and that our Ambassador in Moscow is given a far greater voice in the formulation and execution of national policy than has formerly been the case. This would do much to underpin a policy of constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and to help ensure that such a policy will really become--to use a word that a short time ago was fashionable about détente--"irreversible."